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Within the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court had
occasion to pass upon many evidence problems. However, in most in-
stances, unfortunately, the alleged evidentiary error was not the primary
consideration of either the appellant or the court. Consequently, the
appellant and the court did not direct their attention to these matters
with the degree of thoroughness that was given the substantive problems.
Accordingly, the product in a few instances, is not commensurate with
its other efforts. As did my predecessor, I omit, "Those points of evidence
within the sphere of constitutional law, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination and illegal searches and seizures." The legislature did
nothing of note in the evidence field.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Very little of interest in this field occurred during the period covered;
however, it may be well to note the subjects concerning which the Supreme
Court of Florida took judicial notice.
The court took judicial notice: that motorists now traverse the high-
ways at all times of the day and night;' of its own records in other pro-
ceedings;2 of the limitations inherent in the use of the voting machine
so far as the amount of printed matter thereon is concerned;3 that almost
every automobile is equipped with a rear view window, stop lights and
other devices to enable the driver to see following vehicles; 4 that constant
use of steps, although properly constructed of proper material, will cause
such steps to become slick and smooth; that a lot in a subdivision near
a cemetery would not be as readily resalable as one not adjoining a
cemetery;6 that the millions of automobiles produced and sold in this
country and placed on its highways have created a condition that makes
safe, adequate highways the very first order of business of the various
states and their political subdivisions;7 that in Dade County the volume
of divorce cases heard by the Circuit Court is tremendous, and that in a
large proportion of these cases the custody and support of children is
involved; that in many municipal and county buildings space is leased
or concessions are granted to private individuals for the sale of food,
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Keeley v. Keeley, 75 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1954); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v.
Johnson, 74 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1954).
2. Keeley v. Keeley, supra note 1.
3. Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954).
4. Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1954).
5. Bucholtz v. Jacksonville, 72 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1954).
6. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785 (fla. 1954).
7. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 75 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954).
8. In re Rouse, 66 So,2d 42 (Fla. 1953).
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etc.;9 of the distance traveled per second by an automobile traveling at a
specified speed per hour.' 0
The Supreme Court refused to take judicial notice that atrophy of a
person's arm could not have occurred due to a treatment used to maintain
muscle tone thereafter;" that the body of a person who meets death by
drowning will not float until sufficient, time has elapsed for decomposition
to have set in. 12 The court observed, in the case of Forbes v. Bushnell
Steel Const. Co.,13 that even where the trial judge had personal knowledge
of all the facts upon which its decree was based, personal knowledge alone
is not a sufficient predicate for the entry of a final decree, and when
questioned on appeal cannot be upheld.
The court in two cases' made interpretations of the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act.'
BuRDEN OF PROOF
In the year 1898, Professor James Bradley Thayer, generally recognized
as the first to effectively bring to light the dual notion of the burden
of proof, said, "He would do a great service to our law who should thor-
oughly discriminate and set forth the whole doctrine of the burden of
proof.""' Our Supreme Court generally is not disturbed by this dual
notion and continues to employ the term burden of proof without a great
deal of discrimination.
The Supreme Court reiterated the oft and correctly stated principle
that the burden of establishing a right of recovery by a preponderance
of the evidence is upon the plaintiff.' 7  Of course, here the court was
considering the burden of proof in the sense of the burden of persuasion
of the trier of fact. Chaachou v. Chaachou'8 was a suit for divorce, suit
money, counsel fees and alimony, both temporary and permanent. The
relief sought was based upon allegations of a common-law marriage. The
case was before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari seeking
to quash an order holding that a common-law marriage was not sufficiently
established to warrant alimony, suit money and attorneys' fees pendente lite.
9. Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
10. Bessett v. Harkett, 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953).
11. Roberts v. Wofford Beach lotel, 67 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1953). The court ob-
served that judicial notice of scientific facts must be restricted to matters of universal
notoriety and general understanding.
12. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 73 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1954),
13. 76 So.2d 268 (F-la. 1954).d4
14. Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955); Lanigan v. Lanigan, 78 So.2d
92 (Fla. 1955) (The court observed that a party intending to take advantage of the
provisions of the act has the obligation of giving reasonable notice of that intention to
adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise).
15. FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1953).
16. 'hayer, A Preliminary Treatise of Evidence at Common Law (1898).
17. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., snura note 12.
18. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1954).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The court reaffirmed the statement in Fincher v. Fincher" that
"Nothing said herein shall be taken as abrogating or modifying the time
honored rule that when a prima facie case has been established the burden
of proof thereafter shifts to the defendant." (Emphasis added.) The court
apparently was considering the burden of proof in the sense of going
forward with the evidence since the burden of persuasion does not shift.
If the court was employing the term prima facie case in its usually accepted
sense, it would be incorrect to state that when a prima facie case has
been established, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts.
Ordinarily, the term "prima facie case," is restricted to the situation where
the trier of fact is permitted to make a finding of fact but the court does
not grant a peremptory ruling for either party.20
In re Colson's Estate21 also involved an alleged common-law mar-
riage. The court made the following observation: "The burden of proof
was not upon Viola Colson except to establish a prima facie case. Then
the burden of proof shifted. He who asserts the illegality of a marriage
must assume the burden of proving his assertion." It is not quite clear
whether the court considered the establishment of a marriage as a matter
different and apart from the legality of a marriage. The court apparently
when it employs the term "burden of proof" is considering it in its "burden
of persuasion" sense, and, in that event, if legality or illegality is an issue
apart from marriage, then it is not accurate to speak of the burden of
proof or the burden of persuasion as having shifted, but rather it must
be said that the burden of persuasion is initially cast upon the party
seeking to assert illegality.
In re Klinger's Estate22 involved an application for a widow's allowance,
based upon an alleged common-law marriage. On appeal, the widow
claimed that she had made out a prima facie case and that the burden
of proof had shifted to the party contesting her right to the widow's
allowance; also that the burden of proof was not upon her to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that she was the common-law wife of
the deceased. The court observed that, "Although, she was not required,
by a preponderance of the evidence, to prove that she was the wife of
John Klinger, the record fails to reveal even a prima facie case of present
assent or a marriage by repute and habitation." The writer is completely
at a loss to explain this language by the court. Apparently the burden
of persuasion of establishing a common-law marriage or a marriage of
any kind, is not cast upon the alleged widow in a petition for widow's
allowance, but rather is cast upon those opposing its establishment which,
in itself, appears improper. However, if the burden of persuasion is not
19. 55 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1952).
20. See McCormick, Charges on Presumption and the Burden of Proof, 5 NC.L.
REv. 291 (1927).
21. 72 So.2d 57 FIla. 1954).
22. 73 So.2d 50 (fla. 1954).
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cast upon the widow, why then is the burden of going forward with the
evidence cast upon her to establish a prima facie case? We wonder if
the court approved of the alleged widow's position that the burden was
cast upon her only to establish a prima facie case and then the burden
of persuasion shifted? If so, the Supreme Court of Florida is adopting
a rule which is not of general application in any state.
The court was faced with the whistle-bell train situation, 23 (where a
witness wants to testify that he did not hear the bell ring or the whistle
blow); and made the generally accepted holding that in order for negative
testimony to be sufficient to pass the court, it must be made to appear
that the negative statements as to a particular fact were made by persons
whose attention was directed to the fact and that they were looking,
watching and listening for the fact.
Circumstantial evidence of a fact which is not impossible, though
it may be unreasonable, inconsistent or contradictory is sufficient for the
jury's consideration in accordance with the above observation.2 4  The
court properly analyzed the rule dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence
to pass the court.
It is suggested that the court's thoughts on the subject of the burden
of proof could more easily be conveyed if that term were abandoned
and in its stead the terms burden of persuasion of the trier of fact and
burden of going forward with the evidence were employed.
The court, on several occasions, dealt with the problem of the degree
of the persuasion of the trier of fact and confirmed its previous view, that a
confession should not be received in evidence unless there is at least some
prima facie proof of the corpus delecti. 23
The rule of evidence that positive testimony is entitled to prevail
over negative testimony assumes that the witnesses are of equal credibility,26
and the court reaffirmed its position that uncorroborated testimony is not
sufficient to support a decree of divorce. 27
Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America2 l' involved a suit on an
insurance policy in which the disputed question of fact was the cause of
death of the insured. All of the evidence was circumstantial and the
court observed that if the plaintiff is to prevail when circumstantial
evidence is relied upon in a civil case, any reasonable inference deducible
therefrom, which would authorize recovery, must outweigh each and every
contrary reasonable inference.
23. Loftin v. Kubica, 68 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1953).
24. Caledonian Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Coe, 76 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1954).
25. McElveen v. State, 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
26. Paimquist v. DeBan, 69 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1953).
27. Martin v. Martin, 66 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1953).
28. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 73 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1954); see also
Raybon v. State, 75 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1954).
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PRESUMPTIONS
The court considered the existence of several presumptions, and
detcrmined that a presumption exists that the Attorney General properly
performs his duty,29 and that a recent adjudication of insanity creates
a presumption of continued insanity," The court, in the Voelker case,
recognized an exception to the "inference upon an inference" rule where
the first inference is sufficiently strong that it may be treated as a proven
fact. In a very fine decision written by Justice Sebring, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Florida's position as a rule of law presumption jurisdiction; that
is, that the presumption is a rule of law which compels decision in the
absence of evidence; thus shifting the burden of going forward with the
evidence; and when evidence is presented which rebuts the presumption,
the presumption vanishes from the case?,1
RELEVANCY
Ordinarily, in a homicide prosecution, in order that a revolver may be
introduced as evidence of the identity of the accused, there must be a
showing that it was the weapon from which the fatal shots had been
fired or that it was found in the possession of the accused or in the
vicinity where the crime was committed. If no one sees the accused
fire the gun, then failure to show that the bullets removed from the
victim's body were fired from the gun in question, would be such a
break in the chain of evidence as to render the gun and testimony about
it inadmissable. 2
A city ordinance provided that the mayor maintain a watchman at
a railroad crossing, constantly between the hours designated, as being
necessary to warn travelers of approaching trains. Evidence that the
superintendent of the railroad had been told by the mayor that it was
not necessary to "walk a man across" was held not relevant to establish
that the railway was not in violation of the ordinance. 3
The court, in many instances, took the position that evidence of
public liability insurance has probative value on the issue of negligence
in an automobile collision case but none-the-lcss excluded the evidence
as irrelevant on the theory that it only slightly tends to prove what it is
intended to prove, as compared with its prejudicial character. In Daniel
v. Rogers, the court decided that evidence of no public liability insurance
was irrelevant.
29. Miami Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, 66 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1953).
30. Florida P. & L. Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1953).
31. Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954).
32. Coco v. State, 80 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1955).
33. Trabulsy v. Loftin, 76 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1954).
34. 72 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1954).
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PRE-TRIAL EXPERIMENTS
Evidence of a public opinion poll taken before trial for the purpose
of effecting a change of venue was objected to and the objection sustained.
This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the basis that the
results of the poll constituted hearsay and that sufficient similarity of
conditions was not shown. 85
HEARSAY
Appellant's counsel complained of error in the failure of the court
to permit introduction into evidence of prior trial testimony without a
showing that the witness was not available. The court observed that
the introduction of this evidence was purely in the discretion of the
court and there was no showing of abuse of this discretion.36  It is
submitted that this hearsay evidence should not be admissable unless
all of the elements of the exception to hearsay rules are present and that
it is not within the discretion of the trial court to determine that it is
or is not admissible.
In Williams v. State,37 the accused was indicted for murder. The
state called a witness who testified that the accused had said that he
was going to have satisfaction out of the deceased. The defense on
cross-examination, asked the witness if he had so testified at the coroner's
inquest. The witness replied that he had not, but that he had then
testified that a third person said that he was going to kill the deceased.
The defense then sought to prove that the witness had not so testified
at the coroner's inquest and that the record of the proceedings there
contained no such statement. The court decided that the method employed
by the defense was improper, without considering the propriety of admitting
this type of evidence as within the hearsay rule.38
In Martin v. Martins" the disputed question of fact appears to be the
good faith of an offer of reconciliation by the husband. The trial court
admitted the deposition of a witness which showed that the husband
had told the deponent that he was anxious to resume living with his
wife and was also willing to have his wife's mother remain with them.
On appeal, the court decided that this and similar evidence was a violation
of the hearsay rule and not entitled to consideration. The evidence was
admitted in the trial court over objections by the wife's attorney, (which
we assume to have been a proper specific objection and not a general
objection). Since good faith appears to be an issue in the case, might
not the questioned evidence have been admissible under the exception
to the hearsay rule, i.e., declarations expressing a present state of mind
or emotion.
35. Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
36. Abbe v. Abbe, 68 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1953).
37. 74 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1954).
38. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
39. See note 37 supra.
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Evidence of fresh report in a rape case by the prosecutrix is admissible
into evidence. Even where there is no fresh report but consent is an
issue in the case testimony of report, although not part of the res gestae,
may serve the purpose of rebutting the inference of consent that might
have been drawn from silence.40
PAROL EVIDEN C RULE
Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract.
A contemporaneous oral agreement cannot affect the terms of a promissory
note where the matter contained in the oral testimony is considered in
the note.' 1 Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a ballot.42
However, when an ambiguity appears in a written instrument, parol
evidence is admissible 43 to resolve the ambiguity. 4 Parol evidence is also
admissible to establish the fact that a written instrument was not intended
to be effective until the happening of a future event. 4"
PaRVILEGF
Evidence which is relevant, material and competent in all respects,
and may be very helpful to the trier of fact, may be rendered inadmissible
on the theory that there are certain things more important than the
establishment of the truth of the facts. In the case of Brown v. May,"6
the court determined that the privilege with regard to confidential com-
munications between spouses is not terminated by divorce; as is the privilege
of not testifying against a spouse.
A statutory privilege has been created prohibiting the admission into
evidence, with exception as to identity, of accident reports made to the
Department of Public Safety.47  Persons who may have overheard a
driver, or any person involved, making an oral report to a patrolman
investigating an accident, may not testify to what they heard, since this
would render the statute nugatory.48 The writer feels that this is a wise
decision and should be applied to the situation where there has been an
unintentional communication to a third person of a confidential com-
munication between spouses, provided that the spouses have not been
negligent in conducting their conversations.
40. Irvin v. State, supra note 35.
41. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1953). The court also observed
that an equity court must recognize the parol evidence rule.
42. Burke v. Beaseley, 75 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1954).
43. State v. Harrison, 74 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
44. Bassato v. Denicola, 80 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1955).
45. 76 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 317.13, 18 (1953).
47. Herbert v. Garner, 78 So.2d 727 (FIa. 1955).
48. Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1954).
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OPINION
The primary function of witnesses is to describe their observations
to the trier of fact. Opinion evidence is admissible only when the trier
of fact requires assistance; either because of the nature of the inquiry or
because of the inability of witnesses to describe their observations in terms
of fact.
Because of the subject matter of the inquiry, a witness may testify
as to his opinion of the value of real estate, but one who has not been
qualified as an expert may not.49  For the same reason a police officer,
who is qualified as an expert, may give his opinion with regard to speed
as deduced from stopping distances, braking distances and skid marks.50
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Impeachment is a proper function of cross-examination, In a rape
prosecution,5 a deputy sheriff was called by the state. The defendant
on cross-examination proposed to ask the witness whether it was true
that the defendant accused the witness and the sheriff of attempting to
murder him. The court held this improper impeachment. Approval of
this line of questioning would permit a defendant to make wholly un-
founded accusations, and then use them for impeachment at the trial.
The accused in a criminal prosecution52 testified on direct examination
that he was making a "papa-wheel". It then became proper on cross-
examination to interrogate him concerning this even though originally it
would have been inadmissible. When a document is employed on cross-
examination, counsel must permit opposing counsel to examine same.53
COMPETENCY OF WnrrSSEs
A witness who had been adjudged mentally incompetent was permitted
to testify since, notwithstanding such adjudication, a person is competent
as a witness where it is shown that he had a lucid interval. The appellate
court determined that the trial judge could not be said to have committed
reversible or prejudicial error from the fact that witness' testimony itself
was given in a clear and coherent manner and was evidence of his capacity
as a witness.54 The archaic Dead Man's Statute was considered in two
cases, one in which it was considered waived,55 and one in which the
putative grantor of a deed was not precluded from testifying that he did
not execute the deed when the named grantee was deceased.50
49. Kerr v. Carraway, 78 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1955).
50. Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
51. Mortellaro v. State, 72 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1954).
52. Williams v. State, 74 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1954).
53. Florida P. & L. Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1953).
54. In Te. Colson's Estate, 72 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1953).
55. Security Trust Co. v. Calafonas, 68 So.2d 562 (VIa. 1953).
56. Warren v. State, 74 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1954).
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ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION
In the prosecution of an alleged second offender for the purpose of
proving a prior conviction, it is improper to introduce into evidence a
certified copy of the prior judgment and the testimony' of the county
judge before whom the prior conviction took place. Instead, the state
must introduce the information, plea, jurisdiction of the court, verdict
of the jury, judgment and sentence of the court.-', The failure to object
to objctionable evidence constitutes a waiver? 8 The granting of a motion
to strike portions of a complaint, as being evidentiary, does not preclude
their introduction at the trial if the evidence is proper., '
57. Lineberger v. Domino Canning Co., 68 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1953),
58. Boston v. Boston, 67 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1953).
59. McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1953); Coco v. State, 80 So.2d 346
(Fla. 1955).
